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RECENT CASES
found, although the power is conferred to them.23 It is submit-
ted that by the wording of our statutes,24 the holder to the fee
in these public lands would be awarded compensation by the
state without regard to whether the land is being used in a
governmental or proprietary capacity by the owner.
BENNY A. GRAFF
INSURANCE-BINDING SLIPS OR MEMORANDA-THEIR EF-
FECTIVENESS AS TEMPORARY OR INTERIM INSURANCE-The de-
fendant had issued a conditional receipt for premium deposit
to an applicant for a life insurance policy.1 On the back of this
receipt was a clause providing that in the event of rejection
of the application the deposit had to be returned to the appli-
cant. The application was rejected by the insurance company.
The insurance agent did not attempt to return the premium
payment to the applicant until two days after her death, which
occurred seventeen days after the initial deposit.
Plaintiff beneficiary brought an action to recover the full
amount of the insurance. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas held, two justices dissenting, that the defendant was
not liable since the policy clearly meant that there would be no
protection until the deceased was accepted as insurable. The
dissent claimed there was sufficient ambiguity in the policy to
allow an interpretation of the policy as providing a period of
interim insurance until rejection of the policy by returning the
deposit to the applicant. The Nat'l. Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v.
Baker, 354 S.W.2d 1 (Ark. 1962).
A conditional or binding receipt has been accepted as pro-
viding a present period of interim insurance until either ac-
23. N.D. Cent. Code § 32-15-04 (3) "Property appropriated to
public use, but such property shall not be taken unless for a more neces-
sary public use than that to which it has been appropriated already, . . ."
24. N.D. Cent. Code § 32-15-04 "The private property which may be
taken under this chapter includes: (3) Property appropriated to public
use .. ." and § 32-15-01, "Private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation first having been made to or paid
into court for the owner."
1. "If... (2) the proposed insured is, on the date of said deposit and on
the date of any required medical examination, insurable and acceptable in
the opinion of the Company's authorized officers . . . then upon the death or
bodily injury of the proposed insured prior to the date of issue and within
thirty-one days of the date of said deposit, the Company will pay the
benefit, if any, which would have been payable under the provisions of
said policy had its date of Issue been the date of said deposit." The Nat'l.
Life and Ace. Ins. Co. v. Baker, 354 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Ark. 1962).
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ceptance or rejection by the insurer Such interim coverage
has been allowed even without payment of an advance pre-
mium. 3
Early cases allowed recovery by the beneficiary only where
there was a later acceptance.4 Later cases allowed recovery
where the decision had not yet been made by the insurance
company although the conditions to coverage were metA
The practice of taking advance premiums without providing
protection until certain conditions are met, or until a formal
acceptance is given, has been considered contrary to public in-
terest.6 It has been termed an unworthy practice 7 and a device
calculated to deceive. 8
Ambiguity in .a policy usually results in an interpretation
of terms most favorable to the insuredY Therefore an ambig-
uous "binding receipt" clause has been construed as providing
interim insurance.10 Several decisions have allowed recovery
where the rejection was not made known to the applicant by
prompt return of the deposit.11
Uncertainty still exists in the case law in respect to the
construction of binding receipts; 1- however, there has been
2. Duncan v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 137 Ohio 441, 31 N.E.2d
88 (1940); See Pennsylvania Lumbermen's Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Holt, 32
Tenn. 559, 223 S.W.2d 203 (1949); See generally 12 APPLEMAN, INSUR-
ANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 7221 (1941).
3. Harris v. Sachse, 160 Pa. Super. 607, 52 A.2d 375 (1947).
4. The Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Young's Admr. 90 U.S.
85 (1874); Gardner v. North State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 163 N.C. 367, 79 S.E.
806 (1913). "If not accepted the binding slip ceases eo instanti to have any
effect. It does not insure of itself . . . ."
5. Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1947);
Hinkle v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Boston, 147 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.
Iowa 1957).
6. United Founders Life Ins. Co. v. Carey, 247 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1961).
7. Francis v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. pf New York, 55 Ore. 280, 106 Pac.
323 (1910) "It is a practice unworthy of a great business corporation."
(dictum).
8. Western and Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Vale, 213 Ind. 601, 12 N.E.2d
350 (1938) "... by a device calculated to deceive, the applicant is defraud-
ed out of so much of the premium paid as would provide insurance for the
period between the application and acceptance and delivery of the policy."
(dictum).
9. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Hurni Packing Company, 263
U.S. 167 (1923); Newfoundland American Ins. Co. v. Suesz, 289 F.2d 694
(10th Cir. 1961); Manufacturer's Cas. Ins. Co. v. Goodville Mut. Cas. Co., 403
Pa. 603, 170 A.2d 571 (1961).
10. Ransom v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 43 Cal.2d 420, 274 P.2d 633 (1954);
American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. J. C. Thompson, 44 Tenn. App. 627, 316 S.W.2d
52 (1957).
11. Reck v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 116 N.J.L. 444, 184 Atl. 777
(Ct. Err. & App., 1936); Douglass v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n.,
42 N.M. 190, 76 P.2d 453 (1938); Moore v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 222
S.C. 492, 73 S.E.2d 688 (1952). Contra, Leube v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am-
erica, 147 Ohio 450, 72 N.E.2d 76 (1947).
12. See 60 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1947).
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much criticism of the view that they provide only conditional
insurance.13
It is submitted that by these conditional acceptance pro-
visions insurance companies are trying to protect themselves
at the expense of their applicants. They take the premiums but
try to withhold protection. The binding clause is properly in-
terpreted as ambiguous on its face.
North Dakota recognizes that anyone who solicits insurance
in a bona fide manner serves as an agent and can bind his
principal;"4 furthermore, North Dakota recognizes that such
an agent has the implied authority to write temporary poli-
cies.1 In addition North Dakota generally construes ambigu-
ous policies against the insurer.'G
No North Dakota case has directly construed the meaning
of a conditional 'binding receipt." It seems that the better
reasoning would permit our courts to accept the position of the
dissent in the principal case and consider ambiguous binding
receipts as providing unconditional interim insurance until
complete rejection of the application is made.
R. JON FITZNER
SALES-WARRANTIES-DISCLAIMER OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-PROHIBITION OF AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLIcY-Plaintiff pur-
chased one of defendant-dealer's automobiles, signing the
standard contract of the Automobile Manufacturers Associa-
tion which warranted that the vehicle was free from defects
in parts, agreed to replace those parts if found defective, and
provided that the warranty was in lieu of all other warranties,
express or implied. The buyer brought this action to rescind
the purchase because of a breach of the implied warranty of
13. See generally Havighurst, LIFE INSURANCE BINDING RECEIPTS,
33 Ill. L. Rev. 180 (1938); Western and Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Vale, 213
Ind. 601, 12 N.E.2d 350 (1938); Francis v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York,
55 Ore. 280, 106 Pac. 323 (1910); Starr v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York,
41 Wash. 228, 83 Pac. 116 (1905).
14. Fargo Nat'l Bank v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 184 F.2d 676 (8th Cir.
1950).
15. Michigan Idaho Lumber Company v. Northern Fire and Marine Ins.
Co., 35 N.D. 244, 160 N.W. 130 (1916); Ulledalen v. United States Fire Ils.
Co., 74 N.D. 589, 23 N.W.2d 856 (1946) Agent allowed to insure during the
lapse of time between the time of application and the issuing of the policy.
16. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 29 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1928);
Beauchamp v. Retail Merchants Ass'n. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 38 N.D. 483, 165
N.W. 545 (1917); Persellin v. State Automobile Ins. Ass'n., 75 N.D. 716, 32
N.W.2d 644 (1948)"... where the terms of an insurance policy will bear
two interpretations, that one will be adopted which sustains the claim for
indemnity."
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